We use indices from the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative to investigate the impact of climate vulnerability on bond yields. Our methodology invokes panel ordinary least squares with robust standard errors and principal component analysis. The latter serves to address the multicollinearity between a set of vulnerability measures. We find that countries with higher exposure to climate vulnerability, such as the member countries of the V20 climate vulnerable forum, exhibit 1.174 percent higher cost of debt on average. This effect is significant after accounting for a set of macroeconomic controls. Specifically, we estimate the incremental debt cost due to higher climate vulnerability, for the V20 countries, to have exceeded USD 62 billion over the last ten years. In other words, for every ten dollars they pay in interest cost, they pay another dollar for being climate vulnerable. We also find that a measure of social readiness, which includes education and infrastructure, has a negative and significant effect on bond yields, implying that social and physical investments can mitigate climate risk related debt costs and help to stabilize the cost of debt for vulnerable countries.
Introduction
Over the last century, the frequency of natural disasters has increased significantly, as illustrated in Figure 1 , with respect to droughts, extreme temperatures, floods, landslides and storm. While only four major hydrometeorological hazards were recorded in the first decade of the 20th century, the number of hazards rose to 3,362 in the first decade of the 21st century, demonstrating a dramatic increase, also partly due to improvements in record keeping over time. The causes of these hazards are complex, but there is widespread consensus in the scientific community that anthropogenic climate change has led to an increase of temperatures of oceans and the atmosphere, which in turn has contributed to the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Source: Compiled with data from EM-DAT (2018). Note: The count includes events that meet at least one of the following criteria: (i) 10 or more people reported as dead, (ii) 100 people reported as affected, (iii) a declaration of a state of emergency, or (iv) a call for international assistance.
The natural question that arises from the foregoing discussion is how these weather-related catastrophes translate into economic costs. Existing literature suggests that the occurrence of 1 This argument is consistent with the findings of a new report by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU, 2017) , which shows that climate change is increasing the risk of extreme weather events, including droughts, flooding and heatwaves. See also IPCC (2014) and Fischer and Knutti (2015) .
climate-related natural disasters is predicted to rise as temperatures increase, with the prospect of significant negative effects on economic growth (Mei et al. (2015) ; Mendelsohn et al. (2015) ; Felbermayr and Groschl (2014) ; Alano and Lee (2016) ; Ferreira and Karali (2015) ). Indeed, Fig- ure 2 shows the increase in economic losses due to major weather-related events over the last five decades. inhabitants, losses in USD million adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), and this figure as a percent of PPP GDP. The table as a whole is ranked by CRI score, which is based on the other measures shown. The lower the CRI score, the higher a country's level of exposure and vulnerability to extreme events. Individual statistics are ranked out of 182 countries.
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The Climate Vulnerable Forcum (CVF) was established in 2009 as an "International partnership of countries highly vulnerable to a warming planet". The original membership of twenty expanded to 49 countries by 2018. (14) are ranked in the highest 20; the rankings of the rest of the sample countries are below this. Larger more developed countries are subject to higher nominal dollar losses.
As discussed in the literature review below, and highlighted by Gerling (2017) , although research into the long term economic costs of both climate change and disasters is abundant, the body of knowledge is altogether inconclusive. In addition, work on the fiscal impacts of climate change is less well developed. The most critical missing link, however, is the dearth of research that investigates the effect of climate vulnerability on the cost of sovereign debt. This is an important gap in knowledge mainly because the cost at which governments can access finance does not only affect the public budget and the government's ability to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation, but it also constrains possible investments in areas such as infrastructure, education and public health, and has ramifications for investments undertaken by the private sector. In fact, there is likely to be a wide range of spillover effects. Moreover, while existing empirical work shows that the most critical variable affecting the Weighted Average Cost of Capital -which is a crucial variable for investment appraisal -is the sovereign risk score assigned to each country (Ameli et al., 2017) The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 addresses the data underlying this study and is complimented by a table of the variables in Appendix A. Section 4 explains the methodology underlying our empirical model. Section 5 provides some descriptive analysis while the empirical results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 offers some comments on our climate vulnerability cost estimate. We provide a variety of robustness checks in Section 8. Section 9 discusses selection bias that arises from being dependent on bond yield data reported by Bloomberg, and the relationship between this bias and our climate vulnerability measure. We close with a short conclusion.
Brief literature review
Existing literature summarizes the science behind climate change, links it to physical risks and connects this to the functioning of the global economy (see, for example, Farid et al. (2016) ). As It is with Gerling (2017) that the literature begins to examine differences in loss dimensions.
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The paper uses a panel-VARX specification with an exogenous disaster dummy and four endogenous variables (real GDP per capita growth, primary balance, tax revenue and expenditures). The author notes that material damages, people affected and the number of casualties are poorly correlated. Each dimension triggers different macro-fiscal responses. The studies summarized above struggle to answer whether the initial direct costs are compounded by reconstruction efforts crowding out productive capital expenditures, or completely offset by accelerated Schumpeterian creative destruction. Gerling also points out that most studies focus on the economic impact, only a few examine the fiscal performance.
The significance of fiscal effects are difficult to confirm. Acevedo (2014)'s VAR model finds that public debt increases following major floods, but this only applies to a subset of the storms they study. Cabezon et al. (2015) uses a panel VAR model to detect a worsening of the fiscal balance (solely in the first year) for small pacific island states. Melecky and Raddatz (2011) also uses a panel VAR framework and discover that on average budget deficits increase only after climatic disasters, but for lower-middle income countries the increase in deficits occurs across all types of events. Their vector of endogenous variables includes the log of real government expenditures, GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars, the inflation rate and government revenues. The authors build on Melecky and Raddatz (2014) and find that countries with more sophisticated debt markets suffer smaller real consequences from disasters but that their deficits expand further.
In Glass et al. (2015) , Standard and Poor's points out that it is rare for the debt of a country to be downgraded due to a natural disaster. Grenada in 2004, following Hurricane Ivan, is given as one of these exceptional situations. However they point out that a major reason for this is that often the countries most affected do not have a sovereign rating at the date of the catastrophe. Glass et al.
(2015, page 4) conclude: 'We believe that sovereigns most vulnerable to natural hazards are likely to be small island states with next to no geographical diversification and a narrow economic base'
The reviewed literature suggests inconclusive evidence that risky weather events harms economic growth, but becomes clearer with respect to the substantial associated costs. While there is also considerable research in the linked fields of insurance, catastrophe bonds and risk mitigation, 9 there is also relatively little literature on whether risky weather events may trigger a change in ratings, for example a downgrade by rating agencies. There is scant evidence on the mediator / moderator variable that is cost of debt, as it relates to climate risk and vulnerability, and climate related catastrophes, and how climate vulnerability may be increasing this cost of debt capital. An example is the PhD thesis by Ozcan (2005) , which follows an event study methodology. We look to add to the literature an empirical analysis, focused on climate vulnerability and the cost of debt.
The hypothesis that we test is does climate vulnerability and social preparedness impact cost of debt? The set of controls chosen cover the majority of those mentioned in the prior literature.
Data and variables
The data for YIELD is based on weekly bond yield data collected from Bloomberg. This 
Methodology
The weekly bond observations are converted into annual figures in order to perform a panel ordinary least squares analysis (POLS):
Where β is a k × 1 coefficient vector, x t is a k × 1 vector of climate-related variables, γ is a p × 1 coefficient vector, z t is a p × 1 vector of controls. Although α is a k × 1 vector, all the intercepts are assumed to be identical within this framework. This feature is discussed further below. The dependent variable y t are country bond yields. Subscript t is the year. We conduct multiple regressions to test the significance of the set of climate variables and controls.
A fixed effects model where each country has its own intercept was also considered:
Unfortunately, because some countries had very few usable annual datapoints, such a framework risked over-specifying the model. In addition, other variables mimic country effects due to their low variability over time.
Our model is a linear regression model and hence all the standard assumptions apply (OLS assumptions of linearity, spherical error terms, exogeneity Essentially, the average of the V20 sub-sample of explanatory variables is used to derive estimates of climate vulnerability cost. Further, we assume that parameters are constant, i.e. the partial impact of climate vulnerability on cost of debt does not change over time. Specifically, our model only identifies the direct effect of climate vulnerability on cost of debt; indirect effects through macroeconomic variables are not modeled. For example, we do not capture interventions such as IMF support, which is assumed to be exogenous, i.e. independent from climate vulnerability. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all countries. Table 3 focuses on the V20 countries.
Descriptive analysis
Government bond yields are higher in V20 countries on average, and there is a considerable gap in GDP per capita, government revenues and expenditures. The mean of the CPI indicator is clearly highly skewed by extreme observations for both groups. We recommend caution when attempting to interpret these averages as many of these time series are unbalanced e.g. the bond yield data for France covers 1998 to 2018 while the bond yield data for Senegal is only for 2013 and 2014. We note that the measures of climate vulnerability NDS and NDC are higher for the V20 countries, and the measure of social readiness NDSR is lower. From this preliminary description of the data set, the question arises whether the observed difference in cost of capital can be explained by the chosen set of explanatory variables. The data on debt yields is not normally distributed, exhibiting positive skewness due to the large positive outliers shown in Figure 3 . Accordingly, a log transformation is applied to ensure a symmetric distribution of the dependent variable Table 4 shows our initial regression model using POLS with robust standard errors. We present nominal yields in the descriptive statistics above, however as noted the multivariate analysis specifies the natural logarithm of our annual bond yield observations as the dependent variable. All models refer to POLS using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
The explanatory power is satisfactory with an adjusted R-squared of approximately 75%. We observe a positive coefficient on our key climate sensitivity measure NDS, implying the possibility that higher sensitivity may be correlated with higher bond yields. This index includes measures such as food import dependency, slum population and dependency on imported energy. The coefficient on NDC is positive but generally not statistically significant. The negative and significant result on our NDSR measure of social readiness confirms the importance of investments in ICT infrastructure and education in reducing the cost of debt and mitigating the risks of climate change.
The use of a per capita income PCY variable controls for the inherent correlation of many of these measures with gross domestic product.
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We note the high degree of correlation between NDSR, NDS and NDC, leading to high variance inflation factors in excess of the critical value of 10. The matrix of correlation coefficients is presented in Appendix B. We observe that although the acronyms are ND-Sensitivity, ND-Capacity and ND-Social Readiness, sensitivity and capacity are in fact positively correlated at 0.611, while social readiness is negatively correlated with sensitivity at -0.515, and with capacity at -0.886. We suggest that although capacity includes measures such as dam capacity, its effect is to map out the relative paucity of such capacity.
To address the multicollinearity inherent in our climate vulnerability indicators, we conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) of the NDS and NDC variables. Note that NDSR is a preparedness indicator. This statistical methodology allows us to reduce the the number of variables by formulating them as two uncorrelated linear combinations of the variables, the first of which contains the majority of the variance. We determine the number of components appropriate to our model by using a scree plot as shown in Figure 4 . Eigenvalues are below one, after one component is considered, suggesting that a single component is sufficient. All models refer to POLS using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
Based on the PCA model, we define our own climate vulnerability index (SCORE) based on the ND-GAIN sensitivity and capacity indices. Table 5 demonstrates that the SCORE variable has a positive and significant impact on yield -particularly after controlling for multilateral IMF debt yields, which are based on concessionary rates. We note that although country dummies are statistically significant, they are also subject to strong selection biases related to access to financial markets. In summary, our findings suggest that climate vulnerability has a positive impact on cost of debt, while developmental indicators reflected in the NDSR have a negative impact on the cost of debt.
Estimated additional debt cost due to climate vulnerability
Our estimate is based on statistics for external public, publicly guaranteed and private debt Estimated climate vulnerability impacts for V20 countries are shown in Table 6 . The V20 countries included in the empirical model reflect 86% of the external debt reported by the World Bank for the wider V20 group. Multiplying external debt by our estimated climate vulnerability impact of 1.17% (adjusted for log yields and the V20 average climate vulnerability SCORE) generates an estimate of ten year historical cost exceeding USD 62 billion. This estimate of direct effects connects with many related issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. External debt for this sample of V20 countries rose by over 5% in 2016. The percentage of equity to capital required typically increases with perceived risk (e.g. sovereign debt rating), which would be more of an issue in V20 countries as (1) equity is generally scarce in less developed, largely domestic financial systems and (2) any increase in equity can dramatically increase the weighted average cost of capital. Both the higher debt cost and increased equity requirements would logically decrease the universe of positive net present value investment opportunities relative to required hurdle rates. Similarly higher hurdle rates and worse sovereign credit ratings may decrease the supply of international private sector capital.
To the extent that cost of debt limits investment in key sectors, it would then change the profile of such investment. This might potentially reflect a bias towards conventional investments over sustainable or climate resilient investments with higher initial capex requirements.
Robustness checks
In Table 7 we present three checks of robustness. Column 1 is the empirical result from above.
Column 2 highlights how some controls have negatively impacted the number of observations,
19
specifically with respect to a number of V20 countries. In selecting our empirical model we have prioritized the number of observations. Model [C] in column 3 introduces a risk free rate RFR control based on US 10 year Treasury yields. The number of observations declines as the United States is no longer included in the model as observations of the dependent variable. All models refer to POLS using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
In column 4 we address the differences in maturity by introducing a polynomial of the maturity.
Because the cost of debt data is limited for many countries of our sample group, and many choose to issue bonds primarily at maturities other than ten years, we have chosen the most comprehensive time series available for each. Maturities vary from 5 years, 8 years, 9 years, 10 years and 20 years, with 10 years being the most common. This is a non-optimal way to address differences in maturity as it estimates a yield curve assuming that there is a universal yield curve which is unlikely to exist.
Bond yield observations on IMF concessionary debt is not included in model [D] as their maturity is undefined in the data.
These robustness checks confirm the original result of a positive and statistically significant 20 coefficient on the climate vulnerability measure SCORE and a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the social readiness measure NDSR, at the 99.9% significance level.
Sample selection bias
Thus far, our empirical model focuses on countries for which yield data is observable and available via the data provider Bloomberg. This implies that our regression analysis operates under the condition that countries can issue sovereign bonds (and that debt issues are of sufficient size and liquidity to warrant recording by Bloomberg). This is not the case for all V20 countries. Figure 5 plots the predicted probability of facing difficulties in raising capital from debt markets, differentiating the sample countries between membership in the V20 group, and members of the G7 or G24. A clear pattern emerges in that V20 countries, after controlling for all other factors, exhibit a high risk of exclusion, and climate vulnerability makes access to capital markets even more of a challenge. Each dot represents a country-year, and the estimated probability that the specific country-year is not associated with a cost of debt observation within our empirical model. 
Logistic model of exclusion from capital markets
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Conclusion
RFR Bloomberg
The risk free rate is the benchmark US 10 year Treasury yield for any given year in the sample. 
Appendix B. Matrix of correlation coefficients
